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UNCHARTED WATERS:  WHERE WATER IS THE BOSS, THE 
SURFACE ESTATE MUST OBEY, BUT MUST THE MINERAL 
ESTATE?:  BRIGHAM OIL V. NORTH DAKOTA BOARD OF 
UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS AND DISPELLING 
INACCURACIES CAUSED BY THE RIPARIAN DOCTRINES TO OIL 
AND GAS PRODUCTION APPORTIONMENT UNDER 
COMMUNITIZATION AGREEMENTS 
SHANNON E. ROGERS 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article explores intricacies and issues of having navigable 
waterways in the heart of a booming oil and gas extraction industry.  This 
Article explains the potential legal impact riparian doctrines, which are 
typically associated with the surface estate ownership, can have on mineral 
estate ownership interests, and the contractual relationships involved in 
mineral extraction.  This Article identifies issues occurring when the 
riparian doctrines’ surface estate-focused policies, are applied to mineral 
estate leasing practices and the need for different considerations in mineral 
estate transactions.  The first section contains a discussion of Brigham Oil 
v. North Dakota Board of University and School Lands, a case sent back to 
the North Dakota Supreme Court for final disposition.  There is also 
coverage of the effects of the public trust doctrine on the authority of the 
State to grant away mineral estate interests in a navigable shore zone; the 
original balancing interests held by the state and upland riparian land owner 
to the shore zone; and the impact that N.D.C.C. § 47-01-15 and the impact 
of North Dakota Supreme Court’s interpretation of said statute in 
Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, had in modifying the original balance of interests in 
the shore zone.  When writing this Article the case was still under review by 
the North Dakota Supreme Court and therefore in an attempt to avoid 
coming to a solid conclusion on the outcome of Brigham Oil, this Article 
instead focuses on the different areas of law that arise in the determination 
of the ownership interest in the navigable shore zone mineral estate.  
However, it is important to note that since this Article went to editing and 
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publication the North Dakota Supreme Court in Reep v. State, determined 
that the shore zone royalty interest belongs to the state.  In the second half 
of this Article, an analysis of the use of drafting provisions in mineral 
leasing agreements and communitization/unitization agreements can fix 
boundaries of mineral estates to avoid the legal consequences of riparian 
doctrines.  Considering the riparian doctrines at the time of initial leasing or 
communitization may avoid the legal impacts and uncertainties of the 
riparian doctrines.  This Article also examines theremedial approaches of 
the courts in apportioning ownership interests of accreted riparian surface 
estates and an argument for applying an alternative apportionment approach 
to the correlating mineral estate.  This Article uses primarily North Dakota 
and Montana case law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article discusses the impact of the common law doctrines of 
accretion, erosion, reliction and avulsion, hereinafter “riparian doctrines,” 
on the mineral estate boundaries and the mineral benefits in the context of 
riparian lands abutting navigable streams.  There are two broad topics 
presented in the analysis part of this Article.  First, how the mineral estate is 
divided between the riparian landowner and the river bed owner, the state.  
This first discussion focuses on North Dakota law and specifically Brigham 
Oil and Gas, Limited Partnership v. North Dakota Board of University and 
School Lands.1  As this Article was written, the case was being argued and 
considered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The second part focuses 
on on the question of whether riparian doctrines, which physically change 
the surface estate boundaries, may also shift the mineral estate boundaries.  
In particular, the Article considers problems that can arise for determining 
payment of royalties under leases included in commutization agreements in 
which the boundary of lands adjacent to a navigable river have shifted 
subsequent to the survey conducted prior to the lease because of the riparian 
doctrines.  It asks whether there can be language within the 
communitization agreement fixing boundaries of the mineral estate as 
reflected by the surface estate surveyed description at the time of execution; 
or remedial language clarifying how to calculate royalties accounting for 
the subsequent boundary changes which are no longer accurately reflected 
in the surveyed description of the surface estate incorporated by reference.  
Differences when the mineral rights are severed are also considered.  The 
primary legal analysis is based on case law from Montana and North 
Dakota. 
Generally, the mineral interests reflected in oil and gas leases and 
communitization agreements are dependent on the surface area.  The 
surface area is based upon accepted survey boundaries contained in the title.  
The issue in Brigham Oil is determining where the boundary divides 
ownership for the mineral estate.  Even after ownership is initially 
established the established land boundaries may be subsequently altered by 
riparian doctrines.  The importance of including the parties’ intent for a 
                                                     
1. 841 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 2013). 
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resolution to shifting boundaries is found in the clause “so long as 
producing . . . .”  This clause operates as an opportunity to extend the initial 
term of the lease.  Once production begins, the lease is in its secondary term 
and royalties will have to be paid.  The amount of royalty the operator pays 
to the mineral interest owner is in large part dependent on the surface area 
of the tract.  A lease, or communitization agreement with such a clause, 
holds riparian property for an indefinite term, so long as producing.  The 
indefinite term creates the substantial likelihood that a body of water will 
shift surface boundaries.  The surface area acreage is subject to change from 
shifting boundaries caused by the doctrines of accretion.  The doctrines of 
accretion create uncertainty in accuracy of accounting for royalty payment 
because the royalty is based on the surface area of the riparian land.  
Dispelling this uncertainty is the ultimate goal of this Article. 
The first section of this Article sets out the basic principles and 
doctrines necessary for a discussion of the impacts riparian doctrines have 
on surface and mineral estate boundaries.  The second section of this Article 
discusses the Brigham Oil case and the North Dakota controlling North 
Dakota law behind establishing the mineral estate boundary.  The third 
section discusses the impact the doctrines of accretion have on the 
established mineral estate boundaries.  Additionally, the impacts the 
doctrines of accretion would have on royalty interests memorialized in oil 
and gas leases and communitization agreements are explored.  The final 
section provides drafting suggestions and, alternatively, discusses the 
apportionment methods applied by the courts in lieu of explicit contract 
provisions, which equitably account for the intent of the contracting parties. 
II. THE LAW OF ACCRETION 
The impacts of the riparian doctrines on land boundaries are a primary 
focus for the discussion.  The first concept to understand is the usage of 
water bodies as a demarcation of a land boundary.  The context of this 
analysis is focused on navigable bodies of water in the West.  Navigability 
is an important characteristic because it creates a split ownership situation: 
the bed is owned by the state while the riparian land is owned by another 
party. 
North Dakota and Montana will be the states primarily discussed, and 
imagining the characteristics of the Missouri and the Yellowstone rivers 
and the land surrounding may be helpful.  Wyoming does not have any 
legally defined navigable bodies of water, but because of the substantial 
amount of mineral estate case law within the jurisdiction, Wyoming is 
          
2013] UNCHARTED WATERS 303 
significant to the discussion.  This Article begins with a discussion of 
terminology. 
A. RIVER MEASUREMENT TERMINOLOGY 
The boundaries of riparian lands are identified in a survey by the 
“thread of the river,” for nonnavigable bodies of water, or the “meander 
line,” for navigable bodies of water.  The thread of the river is determined 
when the water is in its natural and ordinary stage, at medium height.2  A 
nonnavigable river’s thread is the center line of the water at its lowest 
stage.3 
Meander lines were run primarily to determine the location and area of 
rivers and lakes.4  The meander line is run by a surveyor for the purpose of 
platting the size and extent of a body of water, and in the case of public land 
patents, the meander line established the boundaries of the riparian tract, 
and established the quantity of land used for calculating the patent fee.5  
Meander lines were run inaccurately and sometimes fraudulently.6  For this 
reason, under federal law, the actual quantity of an upland tract granted by 
federal land patent, except for fraudulent surveys and swamplands, is not 
limited to the meander line as run by the surveyor but to the actual shoreline 
where it exists.7  The purpose a meander line serves in the patenting of 
lands is ascertaining the: 
exact quantity of the upland to be charged for and not for the 
purpose of limiting the title of the grantee to such meander lines.  
It has frequently been held, both by the federal and state courts that 
such meander lines are intended for the purpose of bounding and 
abutting the lands granted upon the waters whose margins are thus 
meandered; and the waters themselves constitute the real 
boundary.8 
In other words, the meander line was used to establish the boundaries of 
patented land, which were riparian in nature, for determining the total 
                                                     
2. CURTIS M. BROWN ET AL., BOUNDARY CONTROL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 200 (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 3d ed. 1986). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 278. 
5. See id. at 200, 278. 
6. Id. at 278. 
7. See generally Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891). 
8. Id. at 380; Foss v. Johnstone, 110 P. 294 (Cal. 1910). 
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upland acreage to charge to the patentee.9  Meander lines are not used to 
determine the tract boundaries.  Meander lines do not bound the grantee’s 
title; rather the actual water line serves as the boundary for lands abutting 
navigable water bodies,10 and the thread of the river constitutes the actual 
boundary for riparian lands abutting nonnavigable water bodies.11 
The meander line or the shoreline can be used in the deed or other 
conveyance instrument to indicate the boundary for the surface of riparian 
lands.  In absence of contrary intent, the shoreline of navigable waters, not 
the meander line, is recognized by state and federal courts as the actual and 
legal surface boundary.12  When land is conveyed in fee, without any 
reservation of interest, the surface boundary description also describes the 
boundary of the mineral estate.13 
The “bed” of the river is the land that “is covered by water sufficiently 
long to keep it bare of vegetation and destroy its value for agriculture.”14  
Original ownership of the bed and the scope of riparian rights and 
ownership of the abutting land are determined by navigability.  High 
watermark and low watermark are the specific boundary demarcations for 
riparian land usage and ownership of a navigable body of water’s shoreline.  
Where a body of water is adjudged navigable, grants of land bordering the 
navigable water body convey an interest to the ordinary low water mark to 
the upland owner.15  However, the riparian owner’s rights are not absolute; 
the state’s interest in the bed makes them subject to certain public 
interests.16  The shore zone, in between the high and low water marks, for 
                                                     
9. R.R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 74 U.S. 272, 287 (1868) (holding that the meander lines are a 
“means of ascertaining the quantity of the land in the fraction subject to sale, and which is to be 
paid for by the purchaser.”). 
10. “The patent usually conveys title to the actual water line and not to the meander line; the 
meander line is determined as a matter of surveying convenience.”  Bureau of Land Management, 
Basic Law of Water Boundaries, 12 (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.blm.gov/cadastral/ 
casebook/basicwater.pdf. 
11. Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 266 P. 646, 648 (Mont. 1928) (“[t]he general rule adopted 
by state and federal courts is that meander lines run in surveying fractional portions of the public 
lands bordering upon navigable bodies of water, are not run as boundaries of the tract, but for the 
purpose of defining the sinuosities of the banks of the lake or river . . . . The title of the grantee is 
not limited to such meander lines; the waters themselves and not the meander lines constitute the 
real boundary” (citations omitted; emphasis added)). 
12. Id. 
13. See MINERAL ESTATE discussion, infra Part II.E. 
14. BROWN, supra note 2, at 290. 
15. State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 523 N.W.2d 537, 542 (N.D. 1994) (hereinafter Mills 
I; see Andersen v. Monforton, 2005 MT 310, ¶ 26, 329 Mont. 460, 468, 125 P.3d 614, 620 (2005) 
(finding that “Montana statute dictates that unless the grant indicates a different intent, the owner 
of land bordering upon a navigable stream, takes to the edge of the stream at low-water line. 
Section 70–16–201, MCA.”). 
16. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 542; see Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 
172 (Mont. 1984) (holding that “the public has a right to use the state-owned waters to the point of 
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purposes of surface use, is not held as an absolute interest by either the state 
or the upland owner.17  “Although a riparian landowner may claim absolute 
ownership of the land above the ordinary high watermark and the state may 
claim absolute ownership of the land below the ordinary low watermark via 
the public trust and equal footing doctrines.”18  The result is the riparian 
owner of the upland holding: 
[a] right of access to and use of such waters; he has the right to 
accretions and relictions which may attach to such shore; he has 
the right to use such shore in all ways that he may desire, so long 
as and with the exception that he does not interfere with or prevent 
the public from also using or having access to the same for the 
purposes for which the public has a right to use it, viz., navigating, 
boating, fishing, fowling, and like public uses. And the state has 
no right to control or interfere with plaintiff’s said use so long as 
plaintiff does not interfere with said public use.19 
Ultimately, “[t]he parties’ interests in the shore zone are coexistent and 
overlap,” but the right to an alluvium attaching to the shore is vested in the 
upland owner.20 
For nonnavigable bodies of water, the riparian owners on either shore 
own the bed to the common midpoint.21  Watermark changes for 
nonnavigable bodies of water have no effect on ownership interests to the 
bed.  On a navigable body of water, when the riparian doctrines cause the 
watermark to deviate, the ownership interests coincide with the change.22  
Whether the body of water is navigable or nonnavigable is, thus, the 
starting point of the analysis. 
B. NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE DETERMINATION 
“The division of waters into navigable and nonnavigable is but a way 
of dividing them into public and private waters—a classification which, in 
some form, every civilized nation has recognized; the line of division being 
largely determined by its conditions and habits.”23  Determining the 
navigability of a waterway can be challenging since there are both federal 
                                                                                                                           
the high water mark except to the extent of barriers in the waters.”); accord State ex rel. 
Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 1999 ND 75, ¶ 1, 592 N.W.2d 591, 592 [hereinafter Mills II]. 
17. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 544. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 543 (quoting Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 801 (S.D. 1915)). 
20. Id. at 544. 
21. See Kim-Go v. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1990). 
22. Mills II, ¶ 5, 592 N.W.2d at 592. 
23. Curran, 682 P.2d at 169. 
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and state definitions.  Only the federal definition is relevant for determining 
title to the bed.  A question of whether title has transferred from federal to 
state owned must: 
be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever 
according to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that 
property, like all other property in the state, is subject to state 
legislation, so far as that legislation is consistent with the 
admission, that the title passed and vested according to the laws of 
the United States.24 
The federal test for navigability requires that rivers be “navigable in fact” 
requiring that “they are used or are susceptible of being used in ordinary 
condition as highways of commerce over which trade and travel are or may 
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”25 
Another concept establishing state ownership interest in the beds of 
navigable rivers is the equal-footing doctrine.  The equal-footing doctrine, 
as applied by the United States Supreme Court, prescribes that: 
[t]he shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were 
not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were 
reserved to the states respectively . . . [t]he new states have the 
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the 
original states . . . established the absolute title of the States to the 
beds of navigable waters, a title which neither a provision in the 
Act admitting the State to the Union nor a grant from Congress to 
a third party was capable of defeating.26 
The equal-footing doctrine provides that the state received title to the beds 
of navigable river at the time of statehood.  After a river is adjudged 
navigable, the state owns the river bed from the time of statehood.  In 
addition, the equal footing doctrine dictates that the state’s application of 
riparian doctrines controls the legal impacts that navigable waterways have 
on riparian land boundaries, insofar as it ensures state ownership of the beds 
of navigable waterways.27  For purposes of this Article, the analysis 
assumes that the river abutting property boundaries is adjudged navigable. 
                                                     
24. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. 498, 517 (1839). 
25. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012) (quoting The Daniel Ball, 
10 Wall. 557, 563 (1871)). 
26. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 373-74 
(1977) (quoting Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845)). 
27. See id. 
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C. OWNERSHIP INTERESTS IN THE NAVIGABLE STREAM BEDS 
As discussed above, the initial determination of navigability, for 
purposes of title to bed, is according to federal law.28  Once adjudged 
navigable, any further dispossession and changes in land boundaries are 
governed under state law.29  After acquisition of the beds of all navigable 
streams, each state has the right to dispose of the bed as it sees fit, by lease, 
deed or other conveyance instrument.30  A state is subject only to public 
trust limitations in its disposition of its title to the bed.31 
In North Dakota, the state holds title to the beds of all navigable waters 
within the state.32  Where a water line is the boundary of a tract, the water 
line, “no matter how it shifts, remains the boundary.”33  This is an important 
riparian boundary characteristic to keep in mind when determining the 
impact of riparian doctrines on the mineral estate boundaries.  In Montana, 
“[a]ll waters are owned by the State for the use of its people.”34  Section 
67-302, R.C.M.1947, provides that the State of Montana is the owner of the 
land underlying navigable waterways, or the bed.35  Since this Article is 
focused on the impacts of these doctrines on western states, such as 
Montana and North Dakota, and because we are assuming navigability of 
the water bodies, state ownership of the beds is assumed.  The next sub-
section discusses the impacts of the riparian doctrines on the boundaries and 
title to land and mineral estates. 
D. DEFINING ACCRETIONS, AVULSIONS, EROSIONS AND RELICTIONS 
Background on the riparian doctrines, which impact property 
boundaries, will provide the context for understanding their potential affects 
on legal title and mineral interests.  Water bodies do not have a static 
character, being fluid in nature.  Any changes in the water line would 
constitute a change in the boundary lines of the riparian lands abutting 
navigable water bodies.  Since property law is a function of state law, state 
                                                     
28. See Curran, supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
29. David A. Provinse, 35 IBLA 221 (1978) (“State may not be divested of title to the bed in 
favor of an uplands owner by operation of Federal law, but may only divest itself of title through 
the operation of its own law.”). 
30. BROWN, supra note 2, at 211. 
31. See Mills I, supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
32. Mills II, ¶ 5, 592 N.W.2d at 592-93. 
33. Oberly v. Carpenter, 274 N.W. 509, 513 (N.D. 1937). 
34. Galt v. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987). 
35. Roe v. Newman, 509 P.2d 844, 846 (Mont. 1973) (citing United States v. Eldredge, 33 F. 
Supp. 337 (D. Mont. 1940)). 
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law determines the impact of these water line changes on the riparian 
boundary through the application of riparian doctrines. 
The primary characteristic of riparian land is access to a navigable or 
nonnavigable body of water.36  Riparian ownership and rights exist upon 
conveyance by legal instrument “if property of an upland owner abuts upon 
water and there are no words of exclusion in his deed . . . .”37  However, 
riparian rights will be denied to the owner of upland property if any strip of 
land owned by another sits in between the upland property and a body of 
water.38  These riparian characteristics apply with equal force to the United 
States, as a riparian interest holder, as they do to any other private riparian 
interest holder.39 
The doctrines of accretion and alluvium refer to the end result of 
natural causes “by which land forms by imperceptible degrees, by 
accumulation of material or rescission of the water.”40  The processes of 
erosion, accretion and reliction can generally be discussed as sub-processes 
of the doctrine of accretion, while the resulting land is referred to as an 
alluvium.41  Reliction leaves land uncovered by the gradual receding of 
water.42 
Avulsion is the opposite of accretion in terms of the length of time in 
which it occurs; it is described as “the sudden and perceptible removal of a 
considerable quantity of land by water, such as a river changing its course 
in time of flood.”43  Since avulsion is a more sudden change, and often not 
permanent, title to the bed of a navigable river exposed by avulsion remains 
in the original owner, the state.44  In North Dakota, title to land previously 
containing exposed river banks, covered by an avulsive change in a 
navigable river, remains owned by the original riparian landowner.45  In the 
event of an avulsive change in the course of the navigable waterway, the 
                                                     
36. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (9th ed. 2009). 
37. BROWN, supra note 2, at 199. 
38. Id. 
39. See generally Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd., 429 U.S. at 378; California ex rel. State 
Lands Comm’n v. United States, 805 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1986). 
40. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 199. 
41. See id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See supra notes 39-42, 47 for discussion of the difference between an avulsive change 
and an accreted or relicted change in the bank of a river.  Understanding the court’s analysis for 
distinguishing avulsion from accretion is beyond the scope of this Article. 
45. See J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 
(N.D. 1988). 
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state is entitled to the land previously occupied by the watercourse.46  The 
extent of the bed remains fixed even though the actual bed location has 
changed.  Because the ownership remains the same when an avulsion 
occurs, it does not alter the quantity of riparian land held by the riparian 
owner nor the river bed held by the state.  Since land ownership does not 
change because of avulsion, it is not addressed in this Article. 
Where there is a dispute as to whether land changes resulted from 
accretion or avulsion, it is the presumption that: 
the changes resulted from accretion or erosion and the land 
concededly lying between the riparian lots, as surveyed by the 
government and the present bank of the stream will be presumed to 
be the result of accretion and not of avulsion. One claiming a 
change was by avulsion rather than by accretion has the burden of 
proving the avulsion.47 
For this Article, the changes caused will be presumed to have occurred by 
accretion or reliction.  As a general rule, when an alluvium is created by one 
of the doctrines of accretion, “[o]wnership usually resides in the adjoining 
riparian proprietor.”48  This general rule is followed in all of the states 
referenced here, North Dakota and Montana.49 
When an alluvium forms along multiple riparian tracts, a quiet title 
action is generally commenced to apportion the newly formed shore.  The 
primary concern for apportionment is equitably preserving the riparian 
nature of the land.50  A riparian owner has the right of access to the water, 
and his access cannot be destroyed by the changing levels of the water by 
gradual recession.  The general principle governing the apportionment 
between the riparian owners of the relicted exposed shoreline is that “any 
division of the relicted land shall be equitable and shall be proportional so 
far as to give each shore owner a share of the land to be divided relative to 
                                                     
46. Roe v. Newman, 509 P.2d 844, 846 (Mont. 1973) (citing United States v. Eldredge, 33 F. 
Supp. 337 (D. Mont. 1940)). 
47. Roe, 509 P.2d at 847 (adopting 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 86(c); see also Dartmouth 
Coll. v. Rose, 133 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1965). 
48. 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 86(c). 
49. See generally Wilson v. Lucerne, 150 P.3d 653 (Wyo. 2007); Perry v. Eling, 132 N.W.2d 
889 (N.D. 1965); Jackson v. Burlington N. Inc., 667 P.2d 406 (Mont. 1983).  In terms of the 
impacts the doctrines of accretion have on federal lands, the Interior Board of Land Appeals has 
explicitly acknowledged their impact when they affect a boundary between areas owned by the 
United States and others.  David A. Provinse, 35 IBLA 221, 265 (1978) (emphasis added) 
(holding that “the doctrines of accretion and reliction are not desirable tools for determining the 
coverage of oil and gas leases of riparian, accreted and water covered lands where the entire area 
is owned by the United States and that they are pertinent only). 
50. See Waxman v. Loranger Plastics Corp., 493 A.2d 713, 715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
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his portion of the original shoreline.”51  Riparian owners have the right to 
preserve contact with the water by appropriating the alluvium of the land 
exposed by reliction forming along the shore.52  Alluvium formed by 
accretion or reliction becomes part of the shore and the riparian owner 
acquires title to access the water.53 
There are two methods, logically applicable to this discussion, to 
apportioning ownership interest of an alluvium between adjoining 
owners—the state as bed owner and the riparian land owner:  (1) the 
proportionate “Shore-Line Method;” and (2) the Proportionate Acreage 
Method, or “Acreage Method.”  The Shore-Line Method’s primary goal is 
to reapportion the newly accreted land so that each riparian owner has the 
same percentage of water frontage that was formerly held.54  The Shore-
Line Method is presumably used in areas where water frontage is of high 
value to the property owner, such as highly populated and developed 
coastal waterways or ocean shores.55  In terms of the value of mineral 
estates, the concern for riverfront access is not apparent because most areas 
where mineral development is occurring, involving navigable river bed 
leases, are areas where riverfront development is not as highly valued.56  As 
will be discussed in further detail, the Acreage Method more accurately 
apportions a newly formed alluvium to preserve the interests of the mineral 
estate owner.57  The crux of this Article concerns the impacts of the riparian 
doctrines, including apportionment, on mineral estate interests.  A 
discussion of mineral estate characteristics follows. 
E. MINERAL ESTATES:  SEVERED V. NON-SEVERED MINERAL 
ESTATES 
While the doctrines of accretion can impact the property boundaries on 
the surface of a riparian tract, these doctrines may also impact the 
boundaries below the ground.  “Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad cœlum,” 
                                                     
51. See 2 R. PATTON & C. PATTON, PATTON ON TITLES § 302 (2d ed. 1938); 3 H. FARNHAM, 
THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 841 (1904); 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 422–25 
(1975). 
52. 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 418 (1975). 
53. See id.; JOHN S. GRIMES, CLARK ON SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES § 573 (4th ed. 
1976); 2 RUFFORD G. PATTON & CARROLL G. PATTON, PATTON ON TITLES § 300 (2d ed. 1938). 
54. BROWN, supra note 2, at 221. 
55. Waxman, 493 A.2d at 715 (applying the Shore-Line method in apportioning the shore of 
the Allegheny River). 
56. Two examples include: (1) the Missouri River running through the Bakken Shale Play, 
Wiliston Basin, North Dakota; and (2) the Delaware River running through in the Marcellus Shale 
Play, Alleghany Plateau Appalachian Basin. 
57. See infra notes 101-09, and accompanying discussion on the application of the Acreage 
Method. 
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is the maxim of the law providing the surface owner control over not only 
the surface, but also everything “to the sky and to the depths.”58  All of the 
interests making up an estate held in fee can be transferred, benefited, and 
burdened separately or in part.  By conveyance, an owner of an estate held 
in fee can divide the property rights.  Important for this analysis, an 
independent grant or reservation of the mineral estate effectively severs the 
mineral estate from the surface property.59  This division creates a surface 
estate owner and a mineral estate owner.60  The estates may be held by the 
same person or by different people.  When property interests, below and 
above the surface, are unsevered, held by the same surface owner, the 
doctrine of accretion does not solely impact the surface boundaries.  
Accretion changes both the boundary of the surface estate and the mineral 
estate when not severed.  However, there may be some question as to 
whether, when the mineral estate is severed from the surface estate, any of 
the severed mineral interests may be burdened or benefited by the doctrines 
of accretion’s impact on the surface boundaries.61 
Conceptually the mineral estate is not being impacted by the doctrines 
of accretion; rather, the doctrines of accretion only physically change the 
land overlying the mineral estate.  However, the accretion or erosion of a 
surface estate ultimately can have significant financial impacts on the 
amount of royalty paid to the mineral estate or interest holder.  
Unfortunately, the surface area sitting over an oil or gas play, and subject to 
change by the doctrines of accretion, is a fundamental factor in calculating 
the percentage of the production and the correlative rights attributed to the 
mineral estate.  Thus, surface acreage, as described in the underlying lease, 
is a substantial factor in the allocation of production attributed to the 
underlying mineral leasehold interests.62  These considerations exemplify 
the conundrum of shifting boundaries: how and if the doctrine of accretion 
should shift the mineral estate boundaries of a severed mineral estate. 
                                                     
58. Gas Prods. Co. v. Rankin, 207 P. 993, 997 (Mont. 1922); Robert L. Kimball, Accretion 
and Severed Mineral Estates, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 232, 235 (1986). 
59. See generally Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1983) (discussing conveyance 
language held to severe the mineral estate from the surface estate). 
60. Id. at 622; see also Schank v. N. Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972). 
61. See Schank, 201 N.W.2d at 429.  Stating “possession of the surface of land is not 
possession of the severed minerals; that after severance, surface and mineral estates are held by 
separate and distinct titles in severalty and each is a freeholder estate of inheritance.”  Id.  The 
impact of severance allows the surface estate and the mineral estate to function distinct from the 
other.  The independent nature of severed estates is the basis for questioning whether riparian 
doctrines, which generally impact the surface estate, should be applied to the mineral estate in the 
same manner. 
62. Shell Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 389 P.2d 951, 954 (Okla. 1963). 
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F. MINERAL LEASES AND COMMUNITIZATION AGREEMENTS 
Evaluating the impact of riparian doctrines on mineral estates and the 
further impact on leasing and communitization agreements involving 
riparian lands requires an inquiry into the communitization process and its 
impacts on title and mineral interests.  An oil and gas lease is a contract, 
which reflects both express and implied intentions of the parties, the lessee 
and lessor.63  Consideration is a requirement in all contract formation, along 
with offer and acceptance; in oil and gas leases consideration is generally 
reflected by royalty interest exchanged for the privilege to develop the 
mineral estate.64  A royalty is: 
compensation or consideration a lessee pays to the lessor to secure 
the privilege of exercising the right to explore and develop the 
property for the production of oil and gas. The nature of a ‘royalty’ 
allows the lessee to avoid paying the lessor up front for the 
privilege of exploration, and to defer payment of ‘consideration’ 
upon an eventual yield accruing from the lessee’s production 
efforts.65 
Parties to an oil and gas lease generally contract for the possibility of future 
production, in the lessee’s favor, and the possibility of royalties, in the 
lessor’s favor.66  Oil and gas leases are the underlying documents to a 
communitization agreement, and a communitization and the underlying 
lease are to be read as forming a common contractual scheme.67 
Communitization is the “bringing together of two or more tracts to 
form a drillsite in connection with a program of uniform well spacing in 
order to develop lands as if they were under a single lease.”68  Commonly, 
communitization (such as “unitization” or “pooling”) is “statutory.”  
Separate mineral interests are “pooled” together in order to comply with 
                                                     
63. State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470, 473 (Wyo.1986); accord Irish Oil & Gas v. Riemer, 
2011 ND 22, ¶ 15, 794 N.W.2d 715, 719-20. 
64. See Irish Oil & Gas, ¶ 22, 794 N.W.2d at 721.  See also Whitham Farms, LLC v. City of 
Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137 (Colo. App. 2003) (“The primary consideration in [oil and gas] lease 
transactions is the royalty derived from the development of the resources”); Cheyenne Mining & 
Uranium Co. v. Fed. Res. Corp., 694 P.2d 65, 74 (Wyo. 1985) (“A number of courts have held 
that a conveyance of a mineral interest in consideration of royalties on production amounts to a 
lease . . . .”); 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals § 280 (2009) (stating a promise to develop the leased 
property and pay royalties is sufficient as consideration for an oil and gas lease). 
65. Irish Oil & Gas, ¶ 22, 794 N.W.2d at 721 (quoting Davis v. Meagher Oil & Gas Props., 
Inc., No. 08-1638, 2010 WL 819403, at *3 n.1 (W.D. La.) (W.D. La. Mar. 4, 2010). 
66. Id. at 721. 
67. Wolff v. Belco Dev. Corp., 736 P.2d 730, 732 (Wyo. 1987). 
68. Buddy Cotton, The Basics of Pooling and Unitization in Oil and Gas Leases, MINERAL 
RIGHTS FORUM (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.mineralrightsforum.com/profiles/ 
blogs/the-basics-of-pooling-and (last visited on Nov. 11, 2012). 
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conservation statutes.69  By communitization, all of the tracts are developed 
as if they are under one lease.  When federal public lands are involved, 
section 226(j) of the Mineral Leasing Act permits commitment of lands 
within a federal lease to a communitization agreement providing for 
apportionment of production or royalty among the separate tracts of land.70 
Communitization does not have the effect of “cross-conveyancing” 
property interests in land; rather, it merely has the effect of apportioning 
production, not proceeds, to the lease.71  Generally communitization 
agreements seek to apportion the production amongst the communitized 
leases based on surface acreage.  The surface estate substantially controls 
the calculation of royalty payments, rental payments and the division of 
royalty payments in a communitized (or unitized) pool.72  Therefore, 
division and an accurate accounting of acreage are significant interests to 
both the lessor, owner of the severed or unsevered mineral estate, and the 
lessee, the drilling company or oil and gas operator. 
The royalty paid under a communitization agreement is determined by 
an algorithm that takes into account a number of factors, but the royalty 
payment is dependent on surface acreage committed.  In Shell Oil Company 
v. Corporation Commission,73 commonly referred to as “Blanchard,” the 
petitioner obtained clarification of the communitization order to establish 
and protect his royalty interest.74  The court held that each lessor was 
entitled to receive “in the ratio that his acreage bears to the unit . . . royalty 
in gas or in the proceeds from the sale of the gas, as his lease may 
require.”75  This holding has resulted in the general rule for royalty 
payments, when a communitization agreement is in effect, that the “lessors 
                                                     
69. Conservation statutes restrict property rights to develop an owner’s mineral estate 
(whether they are established according to ownership-in-place theory or non-ownership theory).  
Conservation statutes are developed by a State’s oil and gas commission (or similarly titled 
governing group).  Most conservation statutes provide for spacing regulations, which restrict the 
number of wells that can be drilled within a specific number of acres.  Wolff, 736 P.2d at 731 
(quoting ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, LAW OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES 
§ 18.01[2] (1986), for the definition of “communitization” as:  “Communitization, or pooling as it 
is usually called where nonfederal lands are involved, is the agreement to combine small tracts for 
the purpose of committing enough acreage to form the spacing and proration unit necessary to 
comply with the applicable state conservation requirements.”).  Id. 
70. 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) (2012). 
71. Moncrief v. DOI, Docket No. C87-1070J (D. Wyo. Sept. 18, 1989). 
72. Id.; see also BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, COMMUNITIZATION HANDBOOK, 
available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/ut/lands_and_minerals/oil_and_gas. 
Par.27827.File.dat/CA-HANDBOOK.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
73. 389 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1963). 
74. Shell Oil Co., 389 P.2d at 954. 
75. Id. (emphasis added). 
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of land participating in a unit agreement share in royalties from the unit 
based upon the number of acres committed to them by the unit.”76 
The basis for apportionment is completely reliant on the number of 
surface acres actually owned at the time the communitization agreement is 
executed.77  Each tract within the communitized area is allocated production 
based on the number of acres in said tract, divided by the total acreage of 
the communitized area, times the production of communitized substances.78  
Parties to a communitization agreement will negotiate the calculation 
method for the division of production, but the surface acreage held by each 
party is not generally up for negotiation as it is usually incorporated by 
reference to the underlying lease.  For these reasons, the changes in surface 
acreage caused by riparian doctrines can have a significant financial impact 
for the owners of the underlying tracts. 
III. BRIGHAM OIL AND GAS V. NORTH DAKOTA BOARD OF 
UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL LANDS:  WHO HOLDS TITLE TO THE 
“SHORE-ZONE” MINERAL ESTATE? 
This case, currently under review by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
addresses the issue of mineral estate ownership in the “shore zone.”  The 
following discussion sets out the law and discusses its application to the 
issue.  The author does not intend to take a stance on which outcome is 
correct.  Rather, the author’s intent is to present the possible arguments and 
considerations of the issue. 
A. MILLS V. SPRYNCZYNATYK 
A 1994 decision from the North Dakota Supreme Court, by interpreting 
North Dakota Century Code title 47 chapter 1 section 15, altered the general 
ownership interests in the shore zone.79  Title 47 chapter 1 section 15 states: 
Except when the grant under which the land is held indicates a 
different intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on a 
navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at 
                                                     
76. Anadarko Prod. Co. v. Taylor, 535 F. Supp. 103, 110 (D. Kan. 1982) (emphasis added) 
(citing Cook, Rights and Remedies of the Lessor and Royalty Owner Under a Unit Agreement, 
Third Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 111 (1952)). 
77. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. 
78. Angela L. Franklin, COMMUNITIZATION AGREEMENTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 
2006 No. 4 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 3.  “For example, if the proration unit for the communitized 
formation is 320 acres and Tract A contains 40 acres, the allocation of production to Tract A is 
40/320 times the production of communitized substances; in other words, Tract A is allocated 
12.5% of the communitized production.” 
79. See generally Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 537. 
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low watermark. All navigable rivers shall remain and be deemed 
public highways. In all cases when the opposite banks of any 
stream not navigable belong to different persons, the stream and 
the bed thereof shall become common to both.80 
The court determined the statute was a statute of construction that 
establishes “the boundary for grants of riparian land and is not itself an 
absolute grant of ownership to the low watermark.”81  The court went on to 
declare that the “takes” was ambiguous.82  Because of the ambiguity the 
court turned to “extrinsic aids” to assist the determination of the impact of 
the statute.83  The court first examined another North Dakota statute 
authorizing the legislature to “regulate ‘ownership’ below the ordinary low 
watermark of navigable waters,” as well as its corresponding New York 
Field Code provision and New York case law interpreting the statute.84  The 
effect of the North Dakota statute and corresponding New York case law 
led the court to conclude that the effect of 47-01-15 was “a rule of property 
for determining boundaries, grants of land bordering on navigable waters 
convey the granted interest to the low watermark, unless otherwise limited 
by the terms of the grants.”85  Thus, the court held that under North Dakota 
Century Code section 47-01-15, “as a rule for interpreting conveyances, a 
riparian grantee ‘takes’ the interest that is granted in the conveying 
instrument to the low watermark, which is the boundary of the grantee’s 
interest.”86 
However, a grant of riparian land could not convey absolute title 
between the low and high watermark.  Rather, the existence of certain 
public rights above the low water mark impaired the absoluteness of the 
upland riparian owner’s interest below the high watermark.  The court 
acknowledged the equal footing doctrine and public trust doctrines as 
impediments on a grantee’s absolute interest.87  Again turning to other 
                                                     
80. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (2012). 
81. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 542. 
82. Id. at 540-41 (“‘Takes’ has many shades of meaning which depend on the circumstances 
in which it is used . . . . The precise meaning of ‘takes,’ and the type of interest the upland owner 
‘takes’ to the low watermark is unclear.”). 
83. Id. at 540. 
84. Id. at 541; St. Lawrence Rail Road Co. v. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1853). 
85. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 542. 
86. Id. at 543.  “We agree with the district court that N.D.C.C. § 47–01–15 is a rule of 
construction for determining the boundary for grants of riparian land and is not itself an absolute 
grant of ownership to the low watermark.”  Id. at 542. 
87. Id. at 543 (acknowledging that these doctrines “establish that the State cannot totally 
abdicate its interest to the high watermark, and that a riparian landowner’s interest to the low 
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courts’ interpretations of similar statutory language, the court determined 
that the State’s and the upland riparian owner’s rights to the “shore zone” 
are coexistent.88  Such an interpretation results in the upland riparian owner 
retaining absolute title to the high watermark and the State retaining 
absolute title in the bed between the two low watermarks, while the “shore 
zone” interests overlap.89  The court characterizes the coexistent interests as 
correlative rights.90  Unfortunately, the court did not detail the nature of the 
specific rights held by each party, merely stating that “[u]nder the public 
trust and equal footing doctrines the State has interests in the shore zone, 
which involve more than a navigational servitude . . . .”  Under North 
Dakota Century Code section 47–01–15, a riparian owner “‘takes’ more 
than the mere right of access to the water.”91  Additionally, since there was 
no specific use of the shore zone being challenged in Mills I the court was 
without claim or controversy and determined that “[t]he shore zone presents 
a complex bundle of correlative, and sometimes conflicting, rights and 
claims which are better suited for determination as they arise.”92  The Mills 
I case left undefined the specific rights to usage and development in the 
shore zone. 
B. BRIGHAM OIL AND GAS 
Brigham Oil and Gas, Limited Partnership v. North Dakota Board of 
University and Schools Lands93 presents the kind of actual controversy 
respecting use of the shore zone the Mills I court’s eluded too.94 The 
Brigham Oil and Gas Company filed an interpleader action, naming the 
State of North Dakota and numerous riparian land owners as defendants, 
seeking declaratory judgment on the ownership rights to mineral estates in 
and under the “shore zone” of the Missouri River.95  Both the State of North 
Dakota Board of University and School Lands and the riparian land owners 
claimed rights to the minerals in and under the “shore zone,” and each had 
                                                                                                                           
watermark is not absolute.”).  See also N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 3; Don Negaard, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in North Dakota, 54 N.D. L. REV. 556 (1977–78). 
88. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 543 (“neither the State nor riparian landowners have absolute title 
in the shore zone and that both parties have correlative interests in the area.”). 
89. Id. at 544. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
92. Id. 
93. 866 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D.N.D. 2012). 
94. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 544  (“In the absence of a claim or controversy regarding the 
specific use of the shore zone, we decline to speculate on the precise extent of the parties’ rights 
and interests vis-a-vis the shore zone.”). 
95. Brigham Oil, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. 
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issued oil and gas leases covering the “shore zone” property.  The action 
was removed to federal district court, because the federal government 
owned title to a portion of the mineral rights involved, and defendant 
riparian landowners cross-claimed asserting a takings claim against the state 
land board’s assertion of absolute title to the mineral estate underlying the 
“shore zone.”96  The federal government was dismissed from the suit, and 
the federal court ultimately decided the required public trust doctrine 
analysis fell within the purview of North Dakota law.97  The case was 
remanded to the North Dakota Supreme Court.98 
The federal district court acknowledged that under the equal footing 
doctrine and public trust doctrine the State of North Dakota originally held 
absolute title to the lands and minerals underlying navigable waterways.99  
However, the federal district court also acknowledged the state’s sovereign 
authority to allocate these property interests to riparian landowners, but 
pointed out that the public trust doctrine limits the state’s authority to 
“completely abdicat[e] its interest in navigable riverbeds.”100  The federal 
district court cited Mills I for the conclusion that “[t]he ‘shore zone’ in 
North Dakota is clearly co-owned by the State and riparian landowners.”101  
Finally, the federal district court held that since the determination of 
ownership interest in the mineral estate in and under the “shore zone” had 
yet to be determined by the North Dakota Supreme Court, this was a “novel 
and important issue of state law” which should be first resolved by the 
North Dakota Supreme Court.102  The case was remanded to the North 
Dakota Supreme Court, and while the federal district court did not provide 
clear direction for final disposition it is telling that the federal district court 
chose to abstain because the public trust doctrine is inherently a matter of 
state law.103  In the words of the federal district court, “State law, subject to 
federal power to regulate vessels and navigation, determines the scope of 
the public trust doctrine.  Thus, the law of North Dakota controls title to the 
‘shore zone’ and would be determinative of the central dispute in this 
lawsuit.”104 
                                                     
96. Id. at 1089. 
97. Id. 
98. Burford Abstention—the federal courts should remand a case to state court when the 
determination ultimately rests in state law and there is insufficient state law precedent to guide the 
federal court in making such final disposition. 
99. Brigham Oil, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. 
100. Id. at 1085. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 1088. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF BRIGHAM OIL IN LIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE:  HOW FAR DOES PUBLIC USE REACH? 
Following what little guidance the federal district court provided, the 
first inquiry is the breadth of the public trust doctrine. Illinois Central 
Railway Company v. Illinois105 is the strongest declaration of the public 
trust doctrine breadth.  The Supreme Court, focusing on the nature of the 
grant, upheld the State’s legislative revocation of a legislative grant, in fee, 
of a mile long stretch of the Chicago harbor.  The Supreme Court 
determined that the in fee nature of the grant was not within the authority of 
the legislature because it was an absolute relinquishment of control over a 
navigable bed, subject to Public Trust restraints.  Joseph Sax summarized 
the Court’s quasi-test for determining whether a state’s allocation of interest 
in property is in violation of the public trust doctrine as: 
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of 
the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism 
upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to 
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public 
uses to the self-interest of private parties.106 
Breaking this statement down, the first requirement is that the “resource” at 
issue be “available for the free use of the general public.”  This communal 
nature of the resource is historically referred to as res communes or res 
publicae, or things owned by all because they are unable to be possessed 
exclusively by any individual.107  The citizens of a state instead hold a 
usufructuary right in resources of a res communes nature.108  The 
usufructuary right can be regulated by the state pursuant to its police 
power.109  For this reason, and as appropriately acknowledged in Brigham 
Oil, state law controls the determination of whether the public trust attaches 
to a resource and whether there has been an infringement upon the public 
trust.110 
                                                     
105. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
106. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970); see also Negaard, supra note 87, at 568. 
107. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896). 
108. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 456. 
109. Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968).  See also Negaard, supra note 
87, at 570 (discussing the history of the public trust doctrine in the state of North Dakota and 
specifically “public trust is closely intertwined with the police power of the state to pass 
reasonable regulations for permissible purposes in furtherance of the state’s duties as trustee for 
the public.”). 
110. Brigham Oil, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1082. 
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Additionally, as the Court discussed in Illinois Central Railway, it is 
this res communes nature that triggers the public trust obligation of the 
state.111  Public trust originally intended to ensure that development in the 
ocean bed did not obstruct navigation; sovereign ownership of the bed gives 
control of its use and the power to ensure uses do not impair the important 
public purpose of navigation.  Under the equal footings doctrine the state is 
given title to the bed.  Under our system of property law, ownership of the 
surface ordinarily carries with it ownership of everything underlying that 
surface.  In this case the underlying area happens to contain oil and gas.  
Examining the Submerged Lands Act and the nature of subsurface minerals 
as interpreted in North Dakota case law, supports this axiom of property 
law—the state absolutely holds title to the oil and gas underlying navigable 
river beds.112  However, whether public trust, and thus a similar need for 
sovereign protection and ownership, extends to the oil and gas has not been 
determined in North Dakota nor in any other jurisdiction.  First, oil and gas 
do not reflect the same res communes nature that the navigable waterways 
have, which is to say an individual can exclusively capture, or exclude 
others from, oil and gas.  Second, the underlying purpose of the public trust 
doctrine is crucial to determining the public trust doctrine’s application. 
The underlying purpose of the state’s title in navigable waterways is to 
preserve public access and is by far the most important public trust 
guarantee.113  The North Dakota Supreme Court slightly expanded upon the 
public access consideration by acknowledging “important aspects of the 
state’s public trust interest, such as bathing, swimming, recreation and 
fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water supplies.”114  
Therefore the argument can be made that the purpose of the state’s public 
trust responsibility should be appropriately narrowed to the preservation of 
the public’s usage of and access to navigable waterways.  The state should 
not restrict an interpretation of North Dakota Century Code section  
47-01-15 that the interest in minerals underlying the “shore zone” belongs 
to the riparian land owner but is burdened by public trust obligations of the 
state. 
However, if this were the accepted argument, there is a conflict 
between the public trust obligation of providing surface access and 
                                                     
111. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 458. 
112. Submerged Lands Act § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012) (reaffirming that title to minerals 
underlying navigable waters at statehood vests in the state and includes the natural resources 
within and under such lands and waters.); see also J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & 
Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 (N.D. 1988). 
113. J.P. Furlong Enters., 423 N.W.2d at 132. 
114. Id. at 140. 
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traditional notions of oil and gas development.  Under oil and gas law, the 
mineral estate has a dominant right to use the surface for extraction; 
development of the “shore zone” surface for oil and gas could impair 
navigability and other public trust uses.  The Mills I decision makes clear 
that the public trust doctrine prevents the state legislature from transferring 
an absolute fee interest in the “shore-zone.”  If the public trust 
responsibility prevents the state from transferring an absolute fee interest in 
the “shore zone” because it is a trust asset, does the public trust 
responsibility prevent the state from alternatively creating a shared 
interest?115  Which is to invite the question, so long as the interest does not 
carry the usual assumption of a dominant right to use the surface wouldn’t 
the public trust interest as interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court 
be preserved? 
Before balancing such a coexistent interest the Supreme Court will 
have to determine whether the North Dakota legislature has the authority to 
allocate a “shore zone” interest, whether surface or mineral, to the riparian 
land owners adjoining the Missouri river through North Dakota Century 
Code section 47-01-15.  Because there is a starting presumption that 
statutes shall be construed to be constitutional/valid, this Article will 
proceed under this presumption and discuss the Supreme Court’s ultimate 
analysis of the statute’s impact on “shore zone” interest in light of the 
state’s public trust responsibilities. 
A discussion of the historical underpinnings of the public trust doctrine 
is not necessary for purposes of this Article, and the author directs the 
reader’s attention to other articles that thoroughly explore the history of the 
public trust obligation.116  After a state enters the union on an equal footing 
with existing states, state law governs title to the beds of the navigable 
waters.117  However, state control is not without restriction.  The United 
States Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to the state’s 
unfettered right to use or dispose of the bed of navigable waterways in order 
to prevent substantial impairment of the public trust interest in interstate 
and foreign commerce.118  Additionally, and because of the public interest, 
conveyances of sovereign lands by states are subject to heightened scrutiny 
such that there is a presumption against their separation from the 
sovereign.119  This heightened standard may require an express intention by 
                                                     
115. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 542-44. 
116. See Sax, supra note 106; Negaard, supra note 87. 
117. See generally Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892); PPL Montana, 
132 S. Ct. at 1226-27. 
118. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). 
119. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1934). 
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state legislature to be found before the full fee title to sovereign land is 
legally transferred.120 
With these public trust restraints on sovereign authority to transfer 
sovereign lands the issue in Brigham Oil may be resolved.  Although the 
North Dakota Supreme Court was careful to find North Dakota Century 
Code section 47-01-15 not to be a granting statute, it is important to 
determine the statute’s impact on property interests, specifically interests in 
the mineral estate in and under the “shore zone.”  The Brigham court 
indicates that the legislative intent must be construed in accordance with the 
North Dakota Constitution, in particular the anti-gift provision contained in 
Article X.121  The anti-gift provision was intended to curtail those in 
positions of authority from improperly giving or lending state property to 
private citizens.122  For this reason, the court determines that North Dakota 
Century Code section 47-01-15 could not possibly be a granting statute but 
rather a statutory rule of construction for interpretation of conveyancing 
instruments.123  However, the court goes on to make an unqualified 
statement that it is construing the statute so as not to violate the anti-gift 
provision of section 185.124  This issue then becomes, in light of anti-gift 
provision, what type of interest could the legislature create with North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 in the “shore zone.” 
The case law overturning statutes for being in violation of the anti-gift 
provision sheds some light on an invalid conveyance of interest and the 
anti-gift provision’s implication in the present context.  First, in Herr v. 
Rudolf, the court declared that a statute prioritizing former owners over 
other interested purchasers in foreclosure sales violated the anti-gift 
provision.125  The statute favored former owners purchasing at the appraised 
                                                     
120. See Michael G. Fiergola, North Dakota Century Code 47-01-15: Determining North 
Dakota’s Interest in the Beds of Navigable Waters, 59 N.D. L. Rev. 211, 221 (1983). 
121. N.D. CONST. art. X, §18; see Solberg v. State Treasurer, 53 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1952); 
Herr v. Rudolf, 25 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1947). 
122. See Thomas A. Dickson, The Statute of Limitations in North Dakota’s Products 
Liability Act: An Exercise in Futility?, 59 N.D. L. REV. 551 (1983) for further discussion on the 
legislative intent behind the adoption of section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution. 
123. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 542. 
We agree with the district court that North Dakota Century Code section 47–01–15 is 
a rule of construction for determining the boundary for grants of riparian land and is 
not itself an absolute grant of ownership to the low watermark.  As a rule for 
interpreting conveyances, a riparian grantee “takes” the interest that is granted in the 




125. Herr, 25 N.W.2d at 55. 
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land value even though others were willing to pay a greater price.126  The 
court reasoned that the former owners were receiving a donation in the form 
of loss of state revenue of the difference in amount of the appraised value 
and the amount the public was willing to pay.  Thus, such a donation was 
the type of conduct the anti-gift provision intended to prevent.127 
Second, in Solberg v. State, the court found a state statute violated the 
anti-gift provision because it released mineral reservations made by an 
earlier statute.  This statute was found to transfer “to certain designated 
classes or individuals property of the state, held in trust for all the people 
thereof, as a gift.”128  Thus, the statute in effect made a donation to an 
individual of valuable state owned mineral interests. 
These cases represent liberal interpretation of the anti-gift provision, 
which operates to prevent the state from transferring property owned by the 
state in a proprietary capacity.  The present issue, however, concerns lands 
that the state owns in its sovereign capacity—navigable beds.  The 
sovereign capacity is the state’s controlling interest in property held “in 
trust for the people, for purposes of public navigation, commerce and 
fishing . . . .”129  Sovereign title is seemingly encumbered to a greater extent 
than proprietary title, because an invalid transfer of sovereign property is 
dependent upon whether the transfer was contrary to the underlying trust 
purposes—the public’s interest in the preservation or usage of the 
resource.130  Thus, the anti-gift provision essentially places a restraint on the 
State legislature’s ability to transfer the state’s proprietary interest in 
property, a restraint already existing in transfers of property held by its 
sovereign authority.131  Since North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 
impacts a sovereign interest in land rather than a proprietary interest, the 
state legislature’s adoption of such a statute may not directly conflict with 
the anti-gift provision.132  However, the statute may still be found to conflict 
                                                     
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 922. 
128. Solberg v. State, 53 N.W.2d 49, 53 (N.D. 1952). 
129. State v. Longyear Holding Co., 29 N.W.2d 657, 669-70 (Minn. 1947). 
130. See Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452-53 (articulating the analysis of whether a 
transfer of sovereign land underlying a navigable body of water violates the public interest 
depends on whether the grant “substantially impair[s] the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining.”). 
131. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1934) (establishing a presumption against 
transfers that shift navigable property interests away from sovereign control to private proprietary 
control). 
132. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 (1892) (distinguishing between the legal 
treatment of proprietary property and property held in sovereign capacity and articulating that this 
difference dictates the standard to apply when determining whether the transfer is contrary to a 
state legislature’s authority). 
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with the underlying trust purposes if it is interpreted to transfer interests 
encroaching on the underlying public trust interest in navigable 
waterways.133 
As previously discussed, the public trust doctrine may be determined 
not to encumber the mineral estate as the resource is not of a res communes 
nature.  Preservation of a mineral interest is also not related to the interest in 
protecting interstate commerce.  The underlying purpose of the state’s 
public trust responsibility, in preserving the public’s usage and access, does 
not entirely depend on the preservation of the mineral estate. 
The statute was found to be ambiguous; therefore, inquiring into the 
legislative history and intent behind the statute’s adoption provides 
guidance for the proper interpretation and allocation of the “shore-zone” 
interest.134  By prescribing the statute to be solely intended as a statute of 
construction the Mills court may have been alluding to North Dakota’s 
historical treatment of riparian land rights and boundaries.  North Dakota 
Century Code section 47-01-15 was originally adopted in the North Dakota 
territorial code and exists today is unchanged.135  Examining the historical 
impetus for adopting North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 assists 
interpretation of the original intent, function and scope of the statute.136  
Further, historical intent surrounding the statute’s adoption may guide the 
North Dakota Supreme Court’s application of the statute when determining 
the ownership interests in the “shore-zone.” 
The focus of inquiry into the legislative intent behind North Dakota 
Century Code section 47-01-15 must concern whether the intent was merely 
to provide the upland riparian landowner the benefit of surface access to 
navigable waters, that is traditionally attributed to riparian proprietary 
ownership or whether the intent was to provide the upland riparian 
ownership with a greater interest in the shore-zone.  Extrinsic aids which 
may be used to determine legislative intent include the laws upon the same 
or similar subjects and the consequences of a particular construction.137 
                                                     
133. Id. (articulating the analysis of whether a transfer of sovereign land underlying a 
navigable body of water violates the public interest depends on whether the grant “substantially 
impair[s] the public interest in the lands and waters remaining”); see also supra note 106 and 
accompanying text (discussing Joseph Sax). 
134. Mills I. 
135. Originally section 266 of the Dakota Civil Code. Terr. Dak. Civ. Code in 1877 (codified 
at N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (2012)). 
136. See also Dickson, supra note 121.  The article goes into a broad discussion of the 
history and evolution of the statute.  Id.  One argument of the author is that the statute may be void 
ab initio.  However, the state has never raised the issue in litigation.  Since the argument is not at 
issue in Bigham Oil, this discussion is beyond the scope of this article. 
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1–02–39; see also Kim-Go v. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc., 460 
N.W.2d 694, 696 (N.D. 1990); Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889, 901 (N.D. 1965) (“It is a well-
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In all prior precedent from North Dakota, the courts have generally 
interpreted North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 along with 
statutes that specifically concern the apportionment of accretions and 
relictions and a determination of surface boundaries.138  In the concurrence 
of Perry v. Erling,139 a case in which the North Dakota Supreme Court 
faced apportionment of accreted lands between a riparian and formerly  
non-riparian landowners, Justice Teigen concurred specially and provided 
some insight into the legislative intent behind North Dakota Century Code 
section 47-01-15 and similar statutes regarding riparian land boundaries.  
Justice Teigan states after citing other statutes concerning accretion and 
federal law: 
[I]t is clear to this writer that the statutes were adopted upon the 
principle of natural justice that one who sustains the burden of 
losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity of water ought to 
receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion.  The 
legislative intent of the territorial legislature is further clarified 
when I consider the Organic Law-Act of March 2, 1861, Chapter 
86, 12 Statutes at Large 239.  Section 1851 provided: 
‘The legislative power of every Territory shall extend to all 
rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. But no law shall be 
passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil;’ 
Section 1925 provided: 
‘In addition to the restrictions upon the legislative power of the 
Territories, contained in the preceding chapter, section eighteen 
hundred and fifty-one, the legislative assemblies of Colorado, 
Dakota, and Wyoming shall not pass any law impairing the rights 
of private property . . . .’ 
It would be incongruous to reason that the territorial legislature 
enacted the law on accretion on the premise that governmental 
subdivisions bounded by governmental survey lines on all four 
sides, whether owned by the United States or patented and 
privately owned, could be lost to the territory by the encroachment 
thereon by a navigable river. 
                                                                                                                           
settled rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed with reference to other 
statutes concerning the same subject matter or a part of the same general system of legislation, and 
the courts may take judicial notice of the history of the times when they were enacted.”). 
138. See Gardner v. Green, 271 N.W. 775 (N.D. 1937); Perry, 132 N.W.2d at 889; Heald v. 
Yumisko, 75 N.W. 806 (N.D. 1898). 
139. Perry, 132 N.W.2d at 901 (Teigen, J., concurring); see also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-
06-05, 07, 08. 
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It is also significant that no statute, either territorial or State, was 
enacted providing that erosion of the banks of a navigable stream 
conveys the title to the soil remaining below the surface of the 
water in eroded areas to the sovereign. The only basis upon which 
the theory that the submerged lands below the low watermark 
passes by operation of law to the State, when the banks are eroded 
and washed away by action of the water, is the Federal law on 
surveys cited herein that the boundary line of fractional lots shall 
be ascertained by running them from established corners to the 
watercourse. This is a rule of property and we cannot by judicial 
fiat establish another rule which would violate the supreme law of 
the land.140 
The concurring opinion sheds light on the cumulative effect of these 
statutes.  The statutes preserve the riparian private ownership interests, 
protecting the riparian landowner’s benefit of receiving ownership interest 
in accretions without concern for the state retaining ownership over such 
accretions.  These statutes were meant to prevent the dissolution of 
preceding riparian rights from the sovereign’s reassertion of absolute 
ownership over riparian lands transferred because of a shift in a navigable 
waterway.141  Justice Teigen’s take on the legislative intent behind North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15, along with the other statutes 
concerning accretions, strengthens the argument in favor of providing the 
private landowner title interest in the entirety of the shore zone estate, 
including the mineral estate.  However, as the Mills I court already 
determined, the private upland riparian interest cannot be absolute.142 
Turning to a statutory provision from another state, California statute 
section 830 is an analogous provision to North Dakota Century Code 
section 47-01-15.143  Although not a law from North Dakota the statutory 
                                                     
140. Perry, 132 N.W.2d at 901. 
141. See Gardner, 271 N.W. at 780 (N.D. 1937) (quoting GOULD ON WATER § 76 (2d ed.)). 
According to all the decisions in those States in which the lands were originally 
surveyed under the laws of the United States, the lines run by the United States 
surveyors along the river banks are not lines of boundary, the owners of the adjacent 
lands taking at least to the water’s edge, thus giving them the benefit of the river 
frontage, with the right of access to the river, and the incidents of riparian 
proprietorship as to the use of the water. . . . When land owners once become riparian 
proprietors, they are entitled to the accretions, or newly-formed ground which may be 
left by the river after the survey and sale by the United States of the adjacent land, and 
which, if not their property, would separate them from the river. 
142. See Franklin, supra note 78. 
143. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West) (“Except where the grant under which the land 
is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on tide water, takes to 
ordinary high-water mark; when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, where there is no tide, 
the owner takes to the edge of the lake or stream, at low-water mark; when it borders upon any 
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provision is identical to North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 and 
the California Supreme Court has been faced with interpreting its effect on 
shore zone property rights.  In State of California v. Superior Court 
(Lyon),144 the court interprets section 830 and in the opinion cites North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15.  In the case, the State of California 
requested a writ of mandamus to reflect that lands lying between the low 
and high water mark “lands are owned by the state, which acquired title 
thereto by virtue of its sovereignty upon admission to the Union, that they 
have not been conveyed to the owners of the lands along the shoreline, and 
that even if such conveyances have been made, the lands in dispute are 
subject to the [public trust].”145  The California Supreme Court faced a 
similar issue as the North Dakota Supreme Court in Mills I—whether 
section 830 is a statute granting an interest in the shore zone or if it was 
merely a statute of construction.  On this first issue the California Supreme 
Court held the statute did convey title to Lyon and thus into private 
ownership.  Next the court held that such a grant was burdened by the 
public trust as defined by the State of California, which included “public’s 
right in tidelands as encompassing navigation, commerce and fishing, the 
permissible range of public uses is far broader, including the right to hunt, 
bathe or swim, and the right to preserve the tidelands in their natural 
state.”146  Additionally, private title did not prevent the imposition of the 
public trust on the title to lands in between the low and high watermark.147  
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court rejected Lyon’s contention that 
the burdens of the public trust doctrine constitute a taking of private 
property in violation of federal and state constitutional provisions.148  
Instead the California Supreme Court determined that Lyon may utilize the 
lands between the high and low water mark “in any manner not 
incompatible with the public’s interest in the property.”149 
This case, and those cited in the opinion in reference to interpretations 
of analogous statutes to North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15, 
should be used as persuasive precedent and considered by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court in its interpretation of North Dakota Century Code section 
47-01-15 and resolution of Brigham Oil.  The primary difference is that the 
                                                                                                                           
other water, the owner takes to the middle of the lake or stream.”) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-
15. 
144. State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 248 (Cal. 1981). 
145. Id. at 241. 
146. Id. at 250. 
147. Id.; see also Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 801 (S.D. 1915); State v. Korrer, 148 
N.W. 617, 623 (Minn. 1914). 
148. Superior Court, 625 P.2d at 251-52. 
149. Id. at 252. 
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Mills I court determined North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 was 
not a granting statute but merely a statute of construction.  However, even 
though no interest has been directly transferred by the operation of North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 as a statute of construction, Lyon, 
Flisrand v. Madson150 and State v. Korrer,151 all stand for the proposition 
that whatever private interest is determined to exist in the shore zone the 
public trust doctrine still may burden the riparian landowner’s usage. 
If the Supreme Court determines that North Dakota Century Code 
section 47-01-15 allows for private ownership of the mineral estate 
underlying the shore zone, then the division of the mineral interest must be 
defined next.152  Primarily how the interests will be divided: whether both 
the State and the riparian land owner hold some interest (realizing the 
“correlative rights” referenced in Mills), whether one party takes the entire 
bundle of mineral rights, or whether there is some compromised division 
(where the riparian land owner takes ownership of the mineral interest but 
subject to the public trust, e.g. diminishing dominant estate). 
                                                     
150. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 801. 
151. Korrer, 148 N.W. at 623. 
152. An example of the clarification needed is in Mills I where the court analogized the 
shared state-riparian interest in the shore zone to a correlative interest.  Correlative interests are a 
shared interest in an undivided whole; however, the division of such interests remains undefined.  
In clarifying the correlative interests in the mineral estate the Supreme Court may consider a few 
other statutes to avoid creating an irreconcilable conflict or nullity amongst statutes.  N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 1-02-01, 01-02-07 (2011).  First, North Dakota Century Code section 38-09-01 provides 
that every transfer of land “whether by deed, contract, lease or otherwise, by the state of North 
Dakota . . . fifty percent of all oil, natural gas, or minerals which may be found on or underlying 
such land shall be reserved to the state of North Dakota.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01 (2011).  
Further, any conveyancing instrument that does not explicitly contain such a reservation “must be 
construed as if such reservation were contained therein.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01 (2011) 
(emphasis added).  Since this provision applies to all lands owned by the state regardless of how 
title was acquired the Supreme Court should consider this statute in conjunction with North 
Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15 when determining the division of mineral interests that 
underlie the shore zone.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01 (2011).  At the very least, if North Dakota 
Century Code section 47-01-15 is construed to extend to shore zone minerals, thereby providing 
the riparian land owners some mineral interest by construction of the conveyancing instrument in 
light of North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15, then in light of North Dakota Century Code 
section 38-09-01 at the time of transfer from the state to the riparian land owner of the shore zone 
lands the State must have at least retained fifty percent of the mineral interest, or in the alternative, 
the riparian land owners could only have been transferred fifty percent of the minerals underlying 
the shore zone lands.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01 (2011).  See also Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 
2000 ND 169, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d 861, 864 (holding that oil and gas leases are subject to the same 
rules of construction as other contracts and that contracts are to be construed “in light of existing 
statutes, which become part of and are read into the contract as if those provisions were included 
in it.” (citing Reed v. Univ. of North Dakota, 1999 ND 25, ¶ 22 n.4, 589 N.W.2d 880, 886).  
Additionally, North Dakota Century Code sections 38-11-02 and 38-11-04 will need to be 
considered when determining which oil and gas lease is controlling.  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-11-
02, 38-11-04 (2011).  Both of these sections control the leasing process to be followed when state 
owned minerals or when state lands are sold that contain a reservation of the mineral interest.  Id. 
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IV. LEGAL EFFECTS OF RIPARIAN DOCTRINES 
The fundamental principle of riparian ownership is that those who 
benefit from accretion are inherently burdened by erosion or submergence.  
The basic premise is that without contrary language restricting the riparian 
rights inherent in upland property abutting a navigable stream, “[w]here a 
water line is the boundary of a given lot that line no matter how it shifts, 
remains the boundary, and a deed describing the lot by number or name 
conveys the land up to such shifting water line.”153 
A. IMPACT OF RIPARIAN DOCTRINES ON DEED AND TITLE 
BOUNDARY DESCRIPTIONS 
Ownership of the bed, to whomever it belongs, does not alter this 
principle.154  When riparian lands are conveyed without contrary language 
the presumption is the riparian rights inherent in the land pass to the 
grantee.  No matter whom the land is conveyed to, the riparian character 
flows through the title conveyance.  The result is the title being both 
benefited and burdened by the riparian nature of the property.  This 
unqualified benefit and burden is the fundamental characteristic of riparian 
ownership and, overtime, the cause of uncertainty in surface acreage.155 
Accounting for the uncertainty caused by the doctrines of accretion is 
discussed in this final section. 
B. MINERAL ESTATE CONSIDERATIONS 
There are two ways to treat the impacts of riparian doctrines on severed 
mineral estate boundaries:  (1) allow the boundaries to be ambulatory; or 
(2) treat the boundaries as fixed.156  There are no federal cases where a court 
determined the impact of the riparian doctrines on mineral estate 
boundaries.  Only a handful of states have addressed this question. 
Montana dealt with this dilemma in Jackson v. Burlington North 
Incorporated,157 concluding that even where mineral rights have been 
severed the boundaries are still subject to the changes in the surface 
boundaries caused by accretion.  Prior to Jackson, only one other state 
court, in Oklahoma, had addressed this dilemma and similarly ruled to 
permit the doctrines of accretion to alter severed mineral estate 
                                                     
153. Jefferis v. E. Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 189 (1890). 
154. BROWN, supra note 2, at 214. 
155. David A. Provinse, 35 IBLA 221 (1978); Forest Oil Corp., 15 IBLA 33, 37 (1974); see 
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912). 
156. Kimball, supra note 58, at 236. 
157. Jackson v. Burlington N. Inc., 667 P.2d 406, 409 (Mont. 1983). 
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boundaries.158  Since these two cases, Texas and Arkansas have similarly 
ruled, concluding that even though severed from the surface estate a mineral 
estate has the same bundle of rights as a surface owner, including the 
riparian rights.159  In these jurisdictions, riparian mineral estates are 
benefited and burdened in the same manner as surface estates by the 
doctrines of accretion.160  This Article examines different approaches to 
achieve a more favorable outcome for parties involved.  Permitting a 
severed mineral estate to be affected in the same way as the surface estate 
ignores is the absence of the intention behind the riparian doctrines’ power 
to alter boundaries, retaining the surface estates’ value created by its 
riparian character.  With a severed mineral estate, the riparian character of 
the surface estate is nonexistent, or at least reduced.  As a starting premise 
the North Dakota Supreme Court wisely recognized that there is a 
difference in the intent and policies behind surface leases and mineral 
leases.  “Unless a different intention is clearly indicated, oil and gas leases 
are not and should not be governed by the law and policy applicable to 
surface leases.”161 
C. INTERACTION OF DOCTRINES ON BOUNDARY DESCRIPTIONS 
CONTAINED IN LEASE, COMMUNITIZATION. 
If a mineral estate owner, royalty holder or mineral developer has yet 
to enter into an oil and gas lease or communitization agreement parties may 
be able to contract out the impacts of riparian doctrines by fixing the 
mineral estate boundaries at the time of contract.  Parties that have an 
understanding of how the language contained in a conveyancing 
instruments can be used to modify the application of riparian doctrines may 
avoid the uncertainty caused by riparian changes.  This subsection focuses 
on the interpretation of mineral lease agreements and communitization 
agreements. 
An oil and gas lease is a contract, and the general principles invoked 
for the construction of contracts and their interpretation are applicable to oil 
and gas lease interpretation.162  The purpose of interpretation or 
construction of any contract is to ascertain the true intent of the parties.163  
                                                     
158. See generally Nilsen v. Tennaco Oil Co., 614 P.2d 36 (1980). 
159. See Ely v. Briley, 959 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); Swaim v. Stephens Prod. 
Co., 196 S.W.3d 5, 10 (Ark. 2004). 
160. Id. 
161. Holman v. State, 438 N.W.2d 534, 539 (N.D. 1989) (adopting reasoning of 3 W. 
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 553 at 599-601 (1958)). 
162. Wolff v. Belco Dev. Corp., 736 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470 
(Wyo. 1986). 
163. Id 
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Unless the terms of the contract are ambiguous, the language used in the 
contract controls the interpretation of the parties’ intent.164  The general 
presumption, in deed conveyance and in lease conveyance, favors 
interpretation of ambiguities for the benefit of the grantee receiving the 
riparian rights, regardless of whether the instrument is interpreted under 
state or federal law.165 
Leases are often incorporated by reference in a communitization 
agreement to establish the boundaries and surface acreage to be used in 
apportioning the production amongst the communitized tract.  The 
underlying lease terms are the foundation for interpreting the terms of a 
communitization agreement.  The ability of the riparian doctrines to alter 
the application of communitization agreements by changing mineral estates 
or, alternatively, the ability of a communitization agreement to alter the 
application of a lease agreement is important to drafting these conveyancing 
instruments to account for the riparian doctrines subsequent effects on the 
royalty interests of mineral interest owners as well as provide the mineral 
developer accuracy in paying out royalties.  For example, if a 
communitization agreement stated “land descriptions for purposes of 
royalties will remain fixed irrespective of any changes caused by accretion 
or reliction.”  Whether communitization language can modify the 
underlying lease’s land description and royalty interest determines whether 
language can or should account for the riparian doctrines in the 
communitization agreement or lease. 
Establishing whether a communitization agreement could be used to 
override subsequent changes in the title, or title boundaries, described in the 
lease is extremely challenging to navigate through because of its shared 
roots of contract and property law.  An approach is “to treat pooling and 
unitization agreements as a special area of contract law, but clearly note that 
these contracts grow out of, and affect, property rights.”166  Keeping this 
approach in mind the following cases divulge how courts may approach 
such an issue. 
In P&M Petroleum Management,167 the IBLA found that to the extent 
that the United States has been divested of title to both mineral and surface 
                                                     
164. State v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1988). 
165. Ranch v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (D. N.D. 1988) aff’d, 905 F.2d 180 
(8th Cir. 1990); State Lands Comm., 805 F.2d at 864. 
166. BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION, 
§19.01, 19-4 to -5 (3d ed. 2003). 
167. P&M Petroleum Mgmt, 140 IBLA 228, 232-33 n.33 (1997).  The IBLA set aside and 
remanded the Deputy State Director’s determination because the Deputy State Director ordered a 
retroactive apportionment of royalty payments based solely on meander lines bounding a 
nonnavigable river indicated in a certified resurvey; rather than examining whether the leasehold 
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estates due to the doctrines of accretion there is a basis for diminishing 
existing leaseholds.  Similar to previously referenced cases, the decision 
establishes that while a resurvey would not alone alter existing leasehold, 
the doctrines of accretion would alter the leasehold to the extent that the 
upland owner has been divested of title.168  Second, the language contained 
in a communitization agreement may modify the provisions of the 
underlying lease and the application of the doctrines of accretion.169  When 
mineral ownership asserted in an underlying lease is the basis of the 
calculation for apportioning the production achieved under a 
communitization agreement, language in the communitization agreement 
may constrain the application of the doctrines of accretion to the underlying 
lease. 
Other case law offers the conclusion that terms of a communitization 
agreement, conflicting with the underlying lease, may implicitly modify the 
lease terms.170  However, much like lease terms, an interpretation that 
implicitly modifies language is predicated on the intent of the parties as 
evidenced by their original consent, lease, or later ratification of the 
modifying document.171  Implicit modification of lease terms is reflected in 
many cases where contract interpretation is used to resolve the conflict 
between the language of communitization agreements and leasehold 
interests, resulting in abrogation of rights provided by the underlying 
lease.172 
For example in Wolff v. Belco Development Corp.,173 the Wyoming 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that explicitly striking a pooling 
clause from the underlying lease prior to executing a communitization 
                                                                                                                           
interests had been divested by the doctrines of accretion shifting the mineral estate beyond the 
medial thread of the nonnavigable river, stating: 
Only to the extent that land has eroded beyond the medial thread is there any basis for 
diminishing an existing leasehold, and this is done not because of the fact of resurvey, 
but rather because, through the process of erosion, the United States has been divested 
of title to both the surface and mineral estates in such land, and it may not lease what it 
does not own. 
Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id.  The IBLA did not comment on the Deputy State Director’s reasoning that the terms 
of the production apportionment in the communitization agreement, lacking language to constrain 
the impact, would be altered by the doctrines of accretion. 
170. Carrington v. Exxon Co., 877 F.2d 1237, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that “the broad 
grant of right of way over the property to the Unit Operator in the [communitization] [a]greement 
conflicts with the pipeline burial clause in the original leases, and that clause therefore does not 
survive the execution of the [communitization] [a]greement.”).  See also Wolff v. Belco Dev. 
Corp., 736 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1987). 
171. Id. 
172. See generally Kysar v. Amoco Prod. Co., 93 P.3d 1272 (N.M. 2004). 
173. Wolff v. Belco Development Corp., 736 P.2d 730, 733 (Wyo. 1987). 
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agreement is controlling in the determination that the communitization 
agreement did not apply to that particular lease.  The court held that even 
though expiration of the lease had occurred, according to the lease terms, 
because of the subsequent execution of a communitization agreement the 
lease had not expired.174  The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the intent 
of the parties as reflected in the language of the communitization agreement 
modified the original intent of the parties as reflected in the underlying 
lease.175 
In another case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the right 
to take “royalty in kind,” as contained in the royalty provision of an 
underlying lease, in light of a later executed communitization agreement.176  
The Court of Appeals found that, notwithstanding the lease language being 
clear and unambiguous in conveying the intent of the parties and that had 
the well had been drilled on the lessor’s tract, there would be entitlement to 
receive the royalty in kind.177  The court allowed the lessor to share in the 
proceeds “because and only because of the execution by him of the 
communitization agreement . . . [the communitization agreement] has 
superseded and taken the place of the royalty provision for payment in kind 
invoked . . . .” in the underlying lease.178  In effect, the Court of Appeals 
amended the underlying lease through interpretation of the communitization 
agreement and the parties conduct. 
Based on these holdings, the underlying lease language controls the 
leasehold interest held under the communitization agreement, where 
contradictory terms in the communitization agreement are lacking.179  When 
doctrines of accretion modify the leasehold interest, there is an implicit 
modification of the overriding communitization agreement.  The opposite is 
also true, if contradictory language in a communitization agreement can 
modify the underlying lease terms, then language in a communitization 
agreement fixing the boundaries, would flow through to modify the 
leasehold interest, so long as it conforms to the intent of the contracting 
parties.180 
                                                     
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ham, 228 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1955). 
177. Id. at 219. 
178. Id. at 220. 
179. Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co., 15 IBLA 216, 223 (1974) (stating that “[i]n the absence of 
an approved communitization agreement full royalty payment to the United States must be made 
in accordance with the terms of lease . . .”). 
180. A resurvey of the boundaries would be required to establish the accurate boundaries at 
the time of communitization agreement execution. 
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Presumably, the intent of the parties is to identify the actual mineral 
acreage and calculate accurate proportions of production to the interest 
holding parties.  The case law suggests that the communitization agreement 
can be used to modify the underlying lease as to both express terms and 
implied terms.  The importance of such a conclusion is the potential to 
account for the impact of the accretion doctrine within the communitization 
agreement, thereby retroactively modifying the boundary language 
contained in the underlying lease.  By accounting for the doctrines of 
accretion in the communitization agreement, or stating that changes in 
ownership caused by the doctrines of accretion will not be considered for 
purposes of royalty payments, attorneys can provide certainty that the lease 
benefits apportioned to the mineral interests, and paid by the operator, 
under the communitization agreement will remain certain regardless of the 
impact the doctrines of accretion have on the surface boundaries. 
Fundamentally, the communitization agreement incorporates a general 
description of the surface area acreage, contained in an underlying lease, to 
account for the appropriate apportionment of production between the 
parties.  Under a communitization all parties in the agreement agree to 
accept royalties based on the land area described.  Actual title will not be 
impacted; rather the agreement represents an agreement to accept payments 
according to the definition of the land area.  One way to avoid the 
uncertainty of the doctrines of accretion on the mineral estate is to contract 
them out of the equation.  Inclusion of a clause in the communitization 
agreement, or underlying lease, fixing the mineral estate boundaries “as of 
the time of execution of the lease” allows parties to avoid the impacts of the 
riparian doctrines on the allocation of leasehold royalties to be paid.181 
                                                     
181. A common law issue to contracting out the riparian doctrines is the possibility of such a 
provision being contrary to state law.  Contract law assumes that existing law at the time of the 
formation of a contract becomes part of the contract.  Most cases that hold a contrary to law 
provision invalid do so because it is contrary to a fundamental public policy.  See Storbeck v. 
Oriska Sch. Dist. No. 13, 277 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 1979); Hall GMC, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 332 
N.W.2d 54, 62 (N.D. 1983) (finding that where applicable state law exists a contract provision 
that is contrary to its application was severed from the agreement).  The state statute was read into 
the agreement and the contrary provisions were severed.); Fremont Homes Inc. v. Elmer, 974 P.2d 
952 (Wyo. 1999) (holding that a provision that was contrary to public policy was unenforceable 
but that the contract was still valid where only a single provision was contrary to public policy and 
considerations for both sides were still sufficient to perform.); Keystone Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 
971 P.2d 1240 (Mont. 1998) (holding a choice of law provision invalid where the choice of law 
was contrary to Montana’s fundamental public policy, Montana had a materially greater interest in 
the particular contractual issue and but for the provision Montana law would operate.).  These 
cases raise the issue of whether the doctrines of accretion are “fundamental public policies.”  The 
primary nature of riparian lands being access to water the doctrine of accretion as to surface 
estates would be viewed by the court as fundamental to its nature and public perception.  
However, when applying the importance of water access to the mineral estate this “fundamental” 
benefit is lessened, if not made obsolete. 
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A clause fixing the mineral estate boundaries removes the uncertainty 
existing in the common law doctrines of accretion.  While this is a negative 
risk to the mineral interest holder who gains by accretion it carries with it 
the benefit that, should erosion occur, their interest is not negatively 
impacted.  More importantly, to the lessee, it enables the oil and gas 
operator or company to accurately account for royalty payments. 
Another impediment to fixing the boundaries under a communitization 
agreement is that such a provision would only survive challenge so long as 
all ownership interests, the state (bed owner) and both riparian owners, the 
federal government possible as one, agree to the boundary terms.182  Such a 
                                                     
182. Jackson v. Burlington N. Inc., 667 P.2d 406, 409-10 (Mont. 1983) (holding that “prior 
exception by a riparian owner on one side of a navigable waterway will not work to divest either 
the State or another riparian owner of its (his) ownership in lands underlying navigable waterways 
or minerals situated in accreted lands”).  Although outside the scope of this article, there is a need 
to consider whether the federal government, by and through agency action, can fix the boundaries 
of a mineral estate underlying public lands.  The answer turns on whether Congress conferred 
discretion on said agency when leasing and managing public lands.  Wildearth Guardians v. 
Salazar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74 (D.D.C. 2011) (acknowledging that where Congress has conferred 
discretion on an agency to lease public lands there is no non-discretionary duty and the agency is 
free to “articulate the process and procedure that it considered necessary and proper to carry out 
the statutory command to lease such lands upon competitive bidding”).  Congress through the 
Mineral Leasing Act confers discretion to commit public lands under a communitization 
agreement: 
For the purpose of more properly conserving the natural resources of any oil or gas 
pool, field, or like area, or any part thereof, . . . lessees thereof and their 
representatives may unite with each other, or jointly or separately with others, in 
collectively adopting and operating under a cooperative or unit plan of development or 
operation of such pool, field, or like area, or any part thereof, whenever determined 
and certified by the Secretary of the Interior to be necessary or advisable in the public 
interest.  The Secretary is thereunto authorized, in his discretion, with the consent of 
the holders of leases involved, to establish, alter, change, or revoke drilling, 
producing, rental, minimum royalty, and royalty requirements of such leases and to 
make such regulations with reference to such leases, with like consent on the part of 
the lessees, in connection with the institution and operation of any such cooperative or 
unit plan as he may deem necessary or proper to secure the proper protection of the 
public interest.  The Secretary may provide that oil and gas leases hereafter issued 
under this chapter shall contain a provision requiring the lessee to operate under such a 
reasonable cooperative or unit plan, and he may prescribe such a plan under which 
such lessee shall operate, which shall adequately protect the rights of all parties in 
interest, including the United States. 
When separate tracts cannot be independently developed and operated in conformity 
with an established well-spacing or development program, any lease, or a portion 
thereof, may be pooled with other lands, whether or not owned by the United States, 
under a communitization or drilling agreement providing for an apportionment of 
production or royalties among the separate tracts of land comprising the drilling or 
spacing unit when determined by the Secretary of the Interior to be in the public 
interest, and operations or production pursuant to such an agreement shall be deemed 
to be operations or production as to each such lease committed thereto. 
30 U.S.C. § 226(m) (2012) (emphasis added).  This provision of the Mineral Leasing Act confers 
discretion to establish the terms of a communitization agreement so long as it is “in the public 
interest.”  Id.  The public interest requirement obligates the Secretary of Interior to prevent water 
and encourage development for the benefit of the public.  See California Co. v. Udall, 296 F.2d 
384, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961).  These general obligations to the public do not prevent the Secretary of 
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clause in a lease agreement would not work, unless all lessors in the 
communitization agreement included such language, because lease 
language would impede the rights of the other riparian property owners, not 
party to the agreement.183  Realistically, the provision fixing the boundaries 
would need to be included in the communitization agreement and at a 
minimum would have to be consented to by the parties holding title to the 
mineral interest on either side of the navigable body of water and the state 
holding title to the bed. 
Contracting to account for such natural changes is just one more item 
to include on the drafting checklist.  However, where the doctrines of 
accretion have altered the surface boundaries, creating an alluvium, and 
parties failed to include such a clause in the communitization agreement, 
the challenge, if the benefited landowner raises the issue, becomes 
interpreting the provisions to accurately reapportion the interests of the 
riparian owners.  For mineral estate owners or mineral developers already 
bound by a mineral lease or communitization agreement, this section 
examines the courts approach to apportioning lands and reestablishing 
boundaries impacted by riparian doctrines.  In general if there is a mistake 
in the boundary description or if the boundary changes because of reliction, 
the impacted party will attempt to quiet title in order to reassert the 
boundaries.  A quiet title action to reclaim land will not fix the boundaries 
nor prevent future impact of the doctrines of accretion on the boundaries of 
the riparian land.184  Judgments do not alter the ambulatory character of a 
riparian boundary rather they merely affirm the title to the lands impacted 
                                                                                                                           
Interior from fixing the boundaries of a federal mineral interest held under an oil and gas lease or 
communitization agreement so long as it can be justified.  Knight v. United Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 
161, 181, (1891) (acknowledging the discretion in regulating in the interest of the public, that  “in 
the administration of such large and varied interests as are entrusted to the land department, 
matters not foreseen, equities not anticipated, and which are, therefore, not provided for by 
express statute, may sometimes arise; and, therefore, that the secretary of the interior is given that 
superintending and supervising power which will enable him, in the face of these unexpected 
contingencies, to do justice” (internal quotes and citations omitted); see also California Co., 296 
F.2d at 388 (permitting the restricting lessee production to protect public interest by preventing 
depression of the market). 
183. See Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Co., 614 P.2d 36, 42 (Okla. 1980). 
[A] non-severed mineral estate would still be subject to loss by virtue of accretion or 
erosion, while a severed mineral estate would not be subject to such loss . . . in 
situations in which a severed mineral interest and a non-severed interest are separated 
by a waterway which constitutes a common boundary, the person owning the severed 
interest could increase his or her estate by virtue of accretion or erosion, but never 
have it decreased, while the owner of the non-severed interest could have his or her 
mineral interest decreased, but could never gain. 
184. Ranch v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (D.N.D. 1988) aff’d, 905 F.2d 180 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (paying credence to “full faith and credit to the quiet title judgments” but stating 
“[n]either the quiet title action nor . . . quitclaim deed relieved the plaintiffs from the burden of 
submergence.”). 
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by the riparian doctrines as of the time they were entered.185  Without 
including language fixing the leasehold boundaries in a communitization 
agreement, quieting title to reflect the boundary changes is a necessary step.  
However, it is important, related to long-term certainty in accurate royalty 
payments, to have an understanding that this will only be permanent so long 
as the doctrines of accretion do not alter the landscape further. 
When the court quiets title to include the newly formed alluvium there 
will need to be an apportioning of the alluvium amongst the riparian 
owners.  When a communitization agreement includes multiple riparian 
owners along a common river bank, in accurately apportioning the newly 
formed shoreline the court will need to consider the mineral interests.  
When the focus is strictly the surface estate interest, the primary concern 
will be equitably preserving the riparian nature of the land.186 
As discussed above, the two methods for apportioning ownership 
interest of an alluvium between adjoining owners are the Shore-Line 
Method and Acreage Method.187  The Acreage Method would be practical 
for apportioning an alluvium in the context of communitized mineral estates 
because it allows a more equitable division in light of the mineral estate 
value.  The Acreage Method apportions the newly accreted lands among 
riparian surface owners so that each owner gains an area of alluvium in 
relation to his former proportionate length of the water frontage.188 
This approach to apportionment better accounts for the intent of the 
contracting parties to an oil and gas lease or communitization agreement.  
Since acreage in an oil and gas lease or communitization scenario is the 
production-payout factor for royalty payment and production 
apportionment, maintaining an area that is equivalent to the pre-accretion 
area would preserve the intent to accurately apportion royalty interest.  
Additionally, the Acreage Method does not require a boundary to be 
necessarily fixed; rather, using the Acreage Method to apportion, allows the 
operator to calculate the new percentages based on the prior proportion of 
production.189  Since apportionment of mineral interest is based on 
correlative surface area instead of exact boundaries, the Acreage method 
coincides with the nature of mineral development. 
Montana appears to apply the Shore-Line Method, at least when 
apportioning the shoreline of a navigable lake.190  The Stidham v. City of 
                                                     
185. See id. 
186. BROWN, supra note 2, at 221. 
187. See supra notes 50-4 and accompanying text. 
188. BROWN, supra note 2, at 221. 
189. Id. at 222. 
190. See Stidham v. City of Whitefish, 746 P.2d 591, 596 (Mont. 1987). 
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Whitefish,191 case does not address the actual apportionment method, 
instead focusing on the appropriate extension of the boundary lines to 
maintain the surface owner’s shoreline access.  North Dakota applied the 
Shore-Line Method in Kim-Jo v. J.P. Furlong Enterprises Incorporated.192  
The court’s reasoning was based in the principle that the most valuable 
attribute of riparian land is “riparian lands adjoin water.”193  The court’s 
reliance on the core principle of the Shore-line may be misguided.  In 
inferring the defining characteristic of riparian lands, access to water, the 
court placed great weight in case law discussing the surface estate 
apportionment value.  There is a significant difference between the value of 
riparian rights for surface owners and mineral estate owners. 
Access to a body of water may be of substantial importance to the 
surface estate owner, but where the mineral estate is severed the holder of 
that interest gains nothing from having equivalent access to water.  If the 
“value” of having equal shoreline access is maintaining docking space, after 
accretion, the Shore-Line Method makes practical sense.194  This analysis is 
appropriate for surface estate apportionment but is fatally flawed when 
considering the value “docking space” would provide a mineral estate 
owner.  Actual acreage is the key factor used for establishing royalty 
payments, rental payments and communitization production-payout.195  
Unless a contrary intention is articulated in the lease, a mineral estate owner 
is generally more interested in increasing overall acreage than increasing 
shoreline access.196  Rather than following policy favorable to the surface 
owner in apportioning property, applying the Acreage Method to apportion 
the mineral estate would reflect the intentions of parties to an oil and gas 
lease or communitization agreement and would support the inherent value 
in the mineral estate. 
Applying the Acreage method to severed mineral estates is not only 
practical, but it preserves the value of a severed mineral estate owner. 
However, applying both apportionment methods is not without some 
conflict.  If the mineral estate were not severed from the surface estate, 
different boundary lines may be created in the surface and mineral estates.  
Applying an alternative method to the mineral estate can establish an 
                                                     
191. See id. 
192. 484 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1992). 
193. Kim-Go, 484 N.W.2d at 121 (emphasis added). 
194. See generally BROWN, supra note 2, at 221-26. 
195. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
196. Holman v. State, 438 N.W.2d 534, 539 (N.D. 1989).  See 3 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF 
OIL AND GAS § 553 at 599-601 (1958) (determining that, “[u]nless a different intention is clearly 
indicated, oil and gas leases are not and should not be governed by the law and policy applicable 
to surface leases.”). 
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alternate set of subsurface boundaries.  Nevertheless, applying different 
apportionment methods provides the most equitable result for both surface 
and mineral estate owners when severed and nonsevered estates are 
communitized.  Even if a differing set of subsurface boundaries were 
created from the independent application of Acreage Method, the boundary 
would not exist as a fixed point.197  Thus, unfixed subsurface boundary 
would not impact the preserved surface estate value of shore-line access. 
Additionally, when the unsevered mineral estate is communitized with 
severed mineral estates, the Acreage Method would result in the most 
equitable division of the newly accreted lands.  Mineral estate owners 
would receive a proportionate percentage increase of the overall production 
in relation to newly accreted land.  Moreover, the Acreage Method would 
be in line with the intent of the parties to an oil and gas lease or 
communitization agreement: accurately representing the actual acreage 
apportionment of production. 
However, courts would not have to struggle through the application of 
these rules if this were negotiated and explicitly included in the lease and 
communitzation agreement.  A provision such as this could be placed in the 
“Choice of Law” subsection.  Consideration of whether an apportionment 
provision would be contrary to law, “contrary to a fundamental public 
policy,” would have to be addressed.  Again, adding the parties’ intent to 
use a specific apportionment method should be added to the list of drafting 
considerations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The issue in Brigham Oil of establishing mineral estate boundaries in 
the “shore zone” is just the first legal consideration when navigable 
waterways overlay a portion of a mineral reserve.  Just as foreseeable acts 
of nature should be considered in drafting a business contract or purchase 
agreement, the doctrines of accretion should be present in the drafting and 
negotiation stages of oil and gas leasing and production allocation in 
communitization agreements.  The two primary considerations are;  (1) to 
determine whether the parties wish to have the doctrines impact their 
mineral interests; and (2) if the first is answered in the affirmative, to 
determine the method of apportionment to apply when changes have 
occurred in the boundaries due to the doctrines of accretion.  “So long as 
producing” is a phrase within a lease or communitization agreement, 
holding riparian property that creates the need to account for shifting 
boundaries due to the doctrines of accretion.  Having the foresight to protect 
                                                     
197. See test accompanying Brigham Oil, supra note 99. 
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the mineral owners’ royalty interest or preserve the certainty in royalty 
apportionment for the operator is the responsibility of the drafting attorneys.  
Understanding the treatment and analysis of the issues provides the drafting 
attorney the ability to prepare the client and control the outcome of such an 
unpredictable shift. 
 
 
